Abstract This paper provides a new estimation method for the marginal expected shortfall (MES) based on multivariate extreme value theory. In contrast to previous studies, the method does not assume specific dependence structure among bank equity returns and is applicable to both large and small systems. Furthermore, our MES estimator inherits the theoretical additive property. Thus, it serves as a tool to allocate systemic risk. We apply the proposed method to 29 global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) to evaluate the cross sections and dynamics of the systemic risk allocation. We show that allocating systemic risk according to either size or individual risk is imperfect and can be unfair. Between the allocation with respect to individual risk and that with respect to size, the former is less unfair. On the time dimension, both allocation fairness across all the G-SIFIs has decreased since 2008.
Introduction
Regulating financial institutions from a macro-prudential perspective aims to mitigate the risk of the financial system as a whole. A crucial issue in designing such regulatory policies is on how to allocate systemic risk of a financial system to individual banks. For that purpose, Acharya et al. (2010) propose an indicator of systemic risk, the marginal expected shortfall (MES). The indicator serves the purpose of systemic risk allocation due to its additive feature. Nevertheless, as we shall point out, the estimation strategy of the MES indicator requires an extra assumption on the dependence between financial institutions and the system. The assumption is valid only for a system consisting of a large number of banks. In this paper, we provide a new estimation method for the MES based on multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). The new method does not depend on particular dependence assumptions, and is applicable to both large and small systems. Our MES estimator inherits the additive property. We apply this new method to evaluate the systemic risk allocation among global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), released by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2011.
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A simple, albeit naive, way for allocating systemic risk is proportional to bank size, in line with the "too big to fail" argument that large banks are more systemically important.
An alternative is to evaluate individual risk of each financial institution first, and then allocate systemic risk according to individual risk indicators. However, these solutions are far from forming a fair allocation of systemic risk, see e.g., Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and Zhou (2010) . A more sensible strategy is then to measure the systemic risk contribution of each financial institution directly. For that purpose, several indicators have been designed.
2 Among the existing systemic risk indicators, we follow Acharya et al. (2010) to use the MES measure, defined as the expected loss on a bank's equity conditional on 1 G-SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, due to their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activities globally (FSB (2011) ).
2 To name a few, the marginal expected shortfall (MES) in Acharya et al. (2010) , CoVaR in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , CoRisk measure in Chan-Lau (2010) , Shapley value measure in Tarashev et al. (2009) , distress insurance premium (DIP) in Huang et al. (2009 Huang et al. ( , 2012 , principal component analysis in Billio et al. (2012) , probability of at least one extra failure (PAO) given a failure in the system in Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) and systemic impact index (SII) in Zhou (2010) . A detailed survey on systemic risk analytics can be found in Bisias et al. (2012) .
the occurrence of an extreme loss in the aggregated returns of the system. Theoretically, the MES is a nice tool for allocating systemic risk due to its additive property.
3 The sum of MES from all banks is equal to a measure of the total systemic risk. As stated in Tarashev et al. (2010) , such an additivity property allows for macroprudential tools to be implemented at bank level. For example, prudential requirements can simply be a linear function of the systemic risk contribution. Empirically, Acharya et al. (2010) employ a single factor model to capture the dependence between the financial system and individual banks and derive an estimator of the MES from that. We show that the single factor model is not valid for systems with a small number of banks, because in such cases the idiosyncratic risks cannot be fully diversified away in the aggregated return of the system. The details on this discussion are given in Section 2.
The MES measure proposed in Acharya et al. (2010) has triggered a number of studies on establishing estimation strategies to it. For example, Engle and Brownlees (2010) apply the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model and develop a dynamic estimator on MES. The major contribution therein is on the dynamic feature, whereas the estimation of MES on each time point is based on a nonparametric kernel estimator. Such a kernel estimator cannot handle extreme cases, which is relevant in measuring financial risks. Cai et al. (2012) propose a MES estimator based on multivariate EVT which can handle extreme cases. They do not assume any specific dependence structure between individual banks and the system. Although such an approach is flexible, it disregards the fact that the system is an aggregation of individual banks, and consequently ignores the additive feature of the MES.
In this paper, we estimate the MES based on multivariate EVT, which is able to handle extreme events. 4 We model the dependence structure across the financial institutions with a broad non-parametric assumption, which does not impose specific parametric models.
Furthermore, our method can be applied to systems consisting of either a large or a small number of banks. Lastly, we take into account the fact that the system return is a weighted average of individual bank returns, as in the MES definition. Therefore, the consequent estimator of MES maintains the additive property.
We apply the new estimation method to estimate the MES of 29 G-SIFIs (FSB (2011)).
We estimate their systemic risk contribution as measured by the MES ratios compared to the total systemic risk. We provide the ranking of their systemic risk contributions in a static study and the dynamics of systemic risk contributions in a moving window analysis.
To explore the fairness of allocating systemic risk based on bank characteristics, we further construct the Gini coefficient based on the MES ratios vis-à-vis size and individual risk of the financial institutions, two potential determinants of systemic risk.
We observe that allocating systemic risk according to either size or individual risk is imperfect and can be unfair. Before 2008, the EU banks take excessive systemic risk with respect to the size, while the US banks take less systemic risk. This pattern is reversed after 2008. We find an opposite result for the allocation fairness with respect to individual risk. Between the allocation with respect to individual risk and that with respect to size, the former is less unfair. On the time dimension, both allocation fairness across all the G-SIFIs has decreased since 2008.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 clarifies the main difference between our model setup and that in Acharya et al. (2010) . Section 3 provides our estimation strategy on the MES. Section 4 applies the method to a global system with a small number of banks. Section 5 discusses the fairness of allocating systemic risk according to two bank characteristics, size and individual risk. Section 6 concludes with a few remarks.
The Marginal Expected Shortfall
In this section, we first review the general framework in Acharya et al. (2010) on measuring systemic risk which leads to the definition of the MES measure. Then, we discuss the limitation of their empirical strategy when applying to systems with a small number of banks. Generally speaking, Acharya et al. (2010) formulate an optimal policy for managing systemic risk which aligns banks' incentive with the regulator. The optimal policy imposes a tax as the sum of banks' individual expected default loss and their expected contribution to a system crisis. The latter is further related to the marginal expected shortfall (MES).
The framework on measuring systemic risk in Acharya et al. (2010) is given as follows. To summarize, the MES measure stemming from the general framework in Acharya et al. (2010) is a suitable measure for systemic risk allocation due to its additive property.
This is valid regardless of whether the system consists of a large or small number of banks.
However, the estimation procedure proposed therein can only be applied to systems with a large number of banks. This is what we intend to overcome in this paper.
Methodology

Preliminaries on EVT
We adopt EVT techniques in constructing an estimator of the MES. We first introduce some preliminary results in EVT. Since our focus is on the downside tail risks, we denote
Value at Risk (VaR) of X i at tail probability level δ, i.e., P (X i > V aR i (δ)) = δ. In addition, denote ES i (δ) as the expected shortfall (ES) of X i at tail probability level δ, 
Multivariate EVT provides broad models on tail dependence, i.e. the extreme comovements among the negative returns of financial institutions. More specifically, for
where L is a finite positive function. From the definition, the L function characterizes the co-movement of extreme events. It is independent from marginal information and does not contain information on the dependence at a moderate level.
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There are several ways to further express L function into an spectral representation.
Here we adopt one that is commonly used, see de Haan and Ferreira (2006) . Let H be any probability measure on
Any qualified H leads to the following L function
Conversely, any L function has the above representation with a suitable H. H is called 7 We refer the readers to de Haan and Ferreira (2006) for some basic properties on the L function.
the spectral measure on W , which characterizes the tail dependence.
The calculation of MES under EVT
In this section, we apply the EVT model to derive a calculation formula on the MES.
Suppose that the weighted negative return of the system is given by
Under the framework in Acharya et al. (2010) 
. Consequently, the relative systemic risk contribution of bank i to the system is given as
We call it the MES ratio.
, which gives the additive property.
The following theorem shows the calculation formula on the MES ratios. The proof of this theorem is postponed to the Appendix. 
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that
and consequently
We give a few examples under specific tail dependence structures.
Example 3.2 The returns of individual banks are tail independent.
In this case, the H measure assigns only positive measures to the corner points of W : it is a discrete measure which concentrates its measure on d points
) with probability 1/d each. Thus, from Theorem 3.1 and Eq.(3.1), we get that
Example 3.3 The returns of individual banks are completely tail dependent.
In this case, the H measure concentrates all its measure on a single inner point
The Estimation of MES
To estimate the MES, we first estimate all the elements in the MES calculation formula: the marginal tail indices α, the scales A i and the spectral measure H on W .
We start with the estimation of the H measure by following the procedure in de Haan and Ferreira (2006) , we obtain d rank sequences
. By choosing a proper m, we select those observations corresponding to the m highest S j values:
Then, for each s ∈ S, we connect the point
and the origin by a straight line, and find the intersection with the plane
By assigning equal weights to those points on W , we get the estimation of the spectral measure H on W . Due to the fact that the dataset is finite, the estimated H measure is always a discrete measure on m points. The theoretical requirement on the choice of m to guarantee the consistency is that as n → ∞, m → ∞ and m/n → 0.
As to the estimation on marginal information, i.e., tail index α and scales A i , they follow the usual univariate EVT methods. By ranking the negative returns of each individual bank i, we get the order statistics X Hill (1975) proposes the so-called Hill estimator in estimating the tail index aŝ
as n → ∞. Then we use the average of allα i to be the estimator as the common tail variance when using a low value of m and a larger bias when using a high value of m.
With estimating α i and
Because m is chosen from a stable part of the plot, a small variation of m value should not change the empirical results to a great extent. 9 The list includes 8 US banks, 17 EU banks (10 EZ and 7 non-EZ banks) and 4 Asian banks (1 Chinese and 3 Japanese banks).
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We collect market data for equity prices and balance sheet data for market capitalization (denoted as MV throughout the rest of the paper) for these 29 banks from
Datastream. Equity prices are in local currencies at a daily frequency. MV is in billions of USD at a monthly frequency.
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We construct two panels: (1) A broader panel with all 29 banks in the period from 9 These G-SIFIs are assessed by scoring selected indicators from five categories with equal weights, i.e., the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global activity and complexity based on data till the end of 2009 (see BIS (2011)).
10 The list is updated by the FSB in November 2012 with some changes, i.e., adding two banks (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria and Standard Chartered) and deleting three banks (Dexia, Commerzbank and Lloyds); see FSB (2012) .
11 One exceptional case is Groupe BPCE. Since the banking group is unlisted, we use data for its investment management and financial services arm, the publicly traded bank Natixis, instead. Similar adjustment has been adopted in other studies; see e.g., Acharya and Steffen (2012) . 
Static MES estimates
For Panel 1, we carry out a static analysis. As to the size used in the MES measure, we employ the end-of-period MV of individual banks and normalize them by the total market capitalization in the system. This reflects the size ratio at the end of the period for these banks. Following the selection procedure on k, we choose k = 60 for 1675 observations in total, which corresponds to a ratio k/n around 3.6%. We calculate the MES ratio and rank them across the 29 banks. The ranking demonstrates their relative systemic risk contribution. On top of that, we estimate the level of MES in terms of its original definition. To achieve this, we first derive the total systemic risk, estimated as the expected shortfall of the system return multiplied by the total MV of the system. The system return is constructed as the weighted average return of all the banks in the system. We again use the size ratios as the weights. The expected shortfall of the system at a probability level 0.1% is estimated based on univariate EVT, as in Eq. (3.2). The MES level (in billion USD) of each bank is then calculated as the MES ratio multiplying with the expected shortfall of the system. These results are shown in Table 1 . We also list in Table 1 Lastly, we investigate whether the static MES estimates are robust when considering a small banking system. Theoretically, our estimation method on the MES can be applied to system with either large or a small number of banks. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee that the MES ratios calculated in a subsystem are equivalent to those calculated in a full system. We conduct additional analyses within regional systems: we estimate the MES ratios of the EU/US/Asian banks when considering the EU/US/Asia itself as the system. These results are then compared with the MES estimates within a global system, i.e., the MES ratios in Table 1 normalized within each region. The results are listed in Table   2 . There is no large difference between the MES ratios calculated within the regional system and those calculated within the global system. Qualitatively, all banks have the same rank in systemic risk contribution globally and regionally, except for four adjacent pairs. Hence, the static results are robust to different setups of system.
Dynamic MES estimates
To investigate on the dynamics of the MES over time, we conduct a moving window relatively large systemic risk contribution during the entire twelve years. This is largely due to its size, because its adjustment factor is always below 1. The fact that Dexia has a low systemic risk contribution is mainly attributed to its small size, as the adjustment factor is close to 1. In particular, its systemic risk contribution decreases after 
Allocation fairness with respect to bank characteristics
In this section, we explore quantitatively the extent to which the MES is related to two potential determinants: the size measured by the MV and the individual risk measured by the VaR and the ES. Theoretically, the systemic risk of a bank may be associated to its size ("too big to fail"), individual risk, interconnectedness ("too interconnected to fail"), and other potential characteristics, such as non-traditional activities ; Moore and Zhou (2012) ; López-Espinosa et al. (2012)). We focus on the first two characteristics because they are also input factors for estimating the MES measure.
As a preliminary evidence, we demonstrate in Fig. 4 Although we observe a strong correlation between the MES ratio and the two bank characteristics, the variations in the correlation coefficients hint that it may not be always fair to allocate the systemic risk according to bank characteristics. Thus, we conduct measures to quantify the fairness and examine their dynamics on the time dimension.
Regional level analyses
We first focus on the MES-size discrepancy at regional level. In Fig. 5a we show the differences between the MES and size ratios aggregated by region. We check statistically whether there is any structural break in the regional gap of the MES-size discrepancies between the US and EU banks during the past twelve years.
We construct a measure on the difference between the logarithms of the MES and MV ratios for each bank i in each window s as Dif f
13 Then, we aggregate the difference by region, and calculate the difference in difference between the US and EU to obtain
We test whether there is a structural break on D s by the Andrews (1993) test. We find a structural break in June 2008 as indicated in Fig. 5a . Before this date, there is excessive systemic risk with respect to size for the EU banks but less systemic risk with respect to size for the US banks. This pattern is reversed after the break.
Similarly, we define a difference in difference measure D IR on the MES-VaR discrepancy at a regional level. We find a structural break in October 2007 as indicated in Fig.   5b . From the two identified structural breaks, we conclude that the US banks as a whole increase their systemic risk contribution since the recent financial crisis.
Bank level analyses
The structural break analysis in Section 5.1 on the allocation fairness is based on the aggregation of the MES-MV or MES-VaR differences by region. We further conduct an analysis at bank level. The idea is similar to the Gini coefficient for quantifying the inequality of wealth distribution.
We start with the MES-size discrepancy. In each month, we sort the 24 banks in an ascending order by Dif f s i , the difference in the logarithms of the MES ratios and the MV ratios. Then we plot the cumulative MES ratios against the cumulative MV ratios following the sorted order. By connecting the cumulative ratios, we get a convex curve starting from (0,0) and ending at (1,1), which lies below the diagonal line. In case the two ratios of the MES and MV perfectly match each other, the curve coincides with the diagonal line. Therefore, this curve is similar to the Lorenz curve, which represents the inequality in the income distribution. More specifically, the curve shows the relative systemic risk distribution with respect to size: for each point (x, y) on the curve, the bottom 100x% banks of the total MV, contribute to 100y% of the total MES. Accordingly, one can calculate the Gini coefficient, as 1−2 * B, where B is the area below the curve. This coefficient is in a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 represents a perfect fairness when allocating systemic risk according to size, 1 represents that such an allocation is completely unfair.
Within the range [0,1], the higher the coefficient the more the unfairness.
For each month, we calculate such a Gini coefficient to measure the unfairness of allocating systemic risk with respect to size. The Gini coefficients are plotted over time
in Fig. 6a and tested for the existence of structural break. From Comparing the two analyses, the Gini coefficients based on the MES and VaR ratios range from 0.07 to 0.19, which is lower than that based on the MES and MV ratios.
Hence, allocating systemic risk with respect to the individual risk is relatively less unfair than that to the size.
Concluding remarks
The MES measure proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) serves the purpose of allocating systemic risk to individual financial institutions thanks to its additive feature. Nevertheless, as we point out, the specific dependence model for estimating MES employed therein is only valid for systems with a large number of banks. In this paper, we develop a new estimation method for the MES based on multivariate EVT. We do not impose specific parametric models, which leads to a method that can be applied to systems consisting of either a large or a small number of banks. Our consequent estimator of the MES maintains the additive property.
We apply the new method to estimate the MES of 29 G-SIFIs from the US, EU
and Asia, and test whether it is fair to allocate systemic risk based on simple bank characteristics, such as size and individual risk. We conclude that allocating systemic risk according to either size or individual risk is imperfect and can be unfair. Both allocation fairness across all the G-SIFIs has decreased since 2008. Between the allocation with respect to individual risk and that with respect to size, the former is less unfair.
At a first glance, our results seem to be counter intuitive: on the one hand, the MES ratio is highly correlated to size, while on the other hand, allocating systemic risk according size is imperfect. In fact, this can be explained by the calculation formula of the MES measure. The calculation of the MES is related to size, but in a non-linear way:
from Eq.(3.4), the MES ratio is the product of size and an adjustment factor, while the adjustment factor is further related to size, individual risk and the dependence across the banks within the system. This argument can be further applied to explain the observed structural breaks in the allocation fairness: it is a potential consequence of the change in the dependence structure across banks. A similar explanation applies to the allocation fairness with respect to individual risk and its structural breaks on the time dimension.
Two recent developments in the global financial system may cause such changes on the dependence across banks. Firstly, financial innovation, in the form of credit derivatives, plays an important role in enhancing the interconnectedness within the global financial system. As pointed out by Allen and Carletti (2006) Our results can contribute to the debate on macro-prudential regulations as follows.
Firstly, regulators may identify SIFIs from simple bank characteristics such as size and individual risks, albeit with caution. Systemic risk contribution of a bank is in general related to these characteristics, but the relation may vary across time. Secondly, information on the dependence structure within the financial system is crucial for regulators to identify SIFIs and allocate systemic risk. Thus a macro-prudential regulatory entity that has an overview of the dependence is necessary for implementing regulation rules towards mitigating the systemic risk.
Our analysis is limited to two simple characteristics of banks, size and individual risk.
Because both characteristics are input factors for estimating the MES measure, they should be regarded as endogenous drivers. An extension of the current study would be to consider exogenous drivers of systemic risk, such as measures on leverage, interbank activities, etc. That is beyond the scope of the current paper and is thus left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1 To prove the theorem, we first introduce an equivalent representation for the spectral measure H: the exponent measure ν.
Hence, we can define L
Since this holds for all A x 1 ,··· ,x d , we get that for all Borel
The two measures H and ν can be transformed from one to the other. Define a one to one mapping π that maps any point
Hence, we have that
Since this relation holds for any set A x 1 ,··· ,x d , it must hold for any Borel set A satisfying (A.1), i.e.
Now, we prove Theorem 3.1 using the exponent measure ν.
follows the d−dimensional EVT setup with all marginal tail indices α, the linear combi-
follows a heavy-tailed distribution with the same tail index α, i.e.,
Next, we calculate E(X i |Y > t) as follows:
Denote the numerator and denominator in the integral as I 1 and I 2 . As t → ∞,
Similarly, as t → ∞,
Combining the limits of the two, we get that lim t→∞
du.
To further derive the limit in terms of the spectral measure H, we apply the transformation relation (A.2). For any
Hence,
Similarly, we have that, Note: At the end of each month, we estimate the MES ratios (in proportion) and MES levels (in billion USD) for 24 G-SIFIs by applying the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 using daily equity returns in the past 4 years. Then we aggregate the estimated MES ratios and MES levels by three regions, the US, the EU and Asia. The upper (lower) panel reports the aggregated MES ratios (levels). Note: At the end of each month, we estimate the MES ratios (in proportion) for 24 G-SIFIs by applying the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 using daily equity returns in the past 4 years. The size ratio of each bank is calculated as the share of the market value relative to the entire system at the end of the month. The size adjustment factor is the quotient between the MES ratio and the size ratio. The upper panel reports the MES ratios, while the lower panel reports the size adjustment factors. Both factors are reported for four selected US banks only. Note: At the end of each month, we estimate the MES ratios (in proportion) for 24 G-SIFIs by applying the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 using daily equity returns in the past 4 years. The size ratio of each bank is calculated as the share of the market value relative to the entire system at the end of the month. The adjustment factor is the quotient between the MES ratio and the size ratio. The upper panel reports the MES ratios, while the lower panel reports the size adjustment factors. Both factors are reported for three selected EU banks only. Note: At the end of each month, we estimate the MES ratios (in proportion) for 24 G-SIFIs by applying the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 using daily equity returns in the past 4 years. The size ratio of each bank is calculated as the share of the market value relative to the entire system at the end of the month. The VaR at a probability level 99.9% is calculated based on the same daily returns following Eq. (3.1). The VaR ratio of each bank is the share of its VaR relative to the entire system. Then we calculate for each bank the differences between the MES ratio and the size (VaR) ratio. The upper (lower) panel reports the aggregated differences between the MES ratio and the size (VaR) ratio by region. We further calculate the difference in the (log) differences between US and EU. The vertical lines indicate the break dates of the difference in differences identified from the Andrews (1993) test. Note: At the end of each month, we estimate the MES ratios (in proportion) for 24 G-SIFIs by applying the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 using daily equity returns in the past 4 years. The size ratio of each bank is calculated as the share of the market value relative to the entire system at the end of the month. The VaR at a probability level 99.9% is calculated based on the same daily returns following Eq. (3.1). The VaR ratio of each bank is the share of its VaR relative to the entire system. Then we sort the 24 banks in an ascending order by the quotient of the MES ratios to the size (VaR) ratios, and plot the cumulative MES ratios against the cumulative size (VaR) ratios following the sorted order, which gives a convex curve starting from (0,0) and ending at (1,1) and lying below the diagonal line. We then calculate the Gini coefficient, as 1 − 2 * B, where B is the area below the curve. The upper (lower) panel reports the Gini coefficients based on the size (VaR) ratios. The vertical lines indicate the break dates of the Gini coefficient identified from the Andrews (1993) test. 
